With the fall of Communism in 1989 the history of Europe entered a new phase. It meant the end of the continent's partitioning into two parts as agreed in Yalta by the victors of the second world war.

After the war a start was made in the western half of the continent on a project to establish the European Union. The aim of this union was to neutralize the effect of the Franco-German animosity that had split the continent and locked it in a seemingly endless cycle of war, violence and alliances. Such national rivalry was to be submerged into the greater framework of a union of independent, sovereign and democratic states, and emphasis was to be placed on the mutual benefits of partnership. Those mutual benefits consisted of increased democracy in the shape of liberal, Christian democratic and social democratic ideologies and practices, the establishment of civil structures, a polity in which the people of Europe could defend their own interests, crossborder cooperation between regions and states and the principle of a free-market economy. By entwining the socioeconomic and political interests of the states in the western part of the continent, peace and stability were established. This project was "overseen" by the United States, and thus the vision of the American President Woodrow Wilson was finally given shape.

However, the Pax Americana only affected the western part of Europe. In the East of Europe war had been followed by the Pax Sovietica. In this region, symbolically closed off by the Iron Curtain, other norms, standards and principles applied. Since 1917 the Soviet Union had been experimenting with various forms of Communism. At no stage did this system prove able to safeguard the freedom of the individual, human rights, civil society, the voluntary partnership of states on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, or the socioeconomic welfare of its citizens. It only became clear in the latter half of the eighties, as a result of the liberal policy pursued by party leader Gorbachov, that the Pax Sovietica had begun to fall apart from within. The technocrats and reformers in the various Communist parties realized that communism as a system had become untenable. They were supported by dissidents – mainly writers from the upper echelons of society – who had taken a public stance against Communism. Western observers witnessed the unfolding of a comparatively complex process involving Communists and non-Communists. The revolutionaries in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968), and the activists in the Polish trade union of Solidarnośæ (1980) had been victorious. However, it proved to be a Pyrrhic victory.

The price that Eastern Europe paid for Communist dominion was a high one. The collapse of Communism left a ruinous, bankrupt legacy. For the first time the population of Eastern Europe became generally aware of acts of repression, executions and mass killings carried out under the responsibility of the Communist regime. Corruption and abuse of power under Communist rule had left its mark on the population. This was evident, for instance, from the turnout percentages for the first free elections held in the region after 1989. These sometimes dipped below the fifty-percent mark. Public suspicion of theauthorities was not easily eradicated. Socioeconomic crises led to the impoverishment of large parts of Eastern Europe, even the regions that between the wars had differed only marginally from Western European States in socioeconomic terms. The region also suffered massive environmental pollution, due to the over-hasty and unstructured establishment of loss-making heavy industry during the Communist regime. Some parts of Eastern Europe simply became a dead zone, uninhabitable for humans or wildlife.

The elite that came to power or retained their grip on power in Eastern Europe after 1989 felt that the solution of their problems lay in Central and Eastern European countries joining the European Union at the earliest possible moment. "Return to Europe" became the winning election slogan of the first freely elected governments in Central and eastern Europe. What people forgot was that the success of the European Union project was entirely due to the Cold War. A small group of states in Western Europe, the nucleus of which was formed by Germany, France and the Benelux states found that their geographical proximity and their more or less comparable level of social and economic development made cooperation easy and effective. In the euphoria of 1989 not only were Central and Eastern European politicians making empty pledges to their electorate , but Western politicians were also making the population of Eastern Europe unrealistic promises about the prospect of speedy integration. The effect was counter-productive. Anti-European feeling on the region was fueled and vocalized when it soon became apparent that these promises could not be fulfilled.

[This volume contains a collection of essays on the progress of Central and Eastern European integration in the European Union a decade after the fall of Communism.]

Development in eastern Europe came as something of a surprise to politicians and policymakers in the West. Shortly after the upheaval it was thought in the West that the introduction of free, democratic elections, civil society and a free-market economy would enable the East to make a rapid transition to a Western polity. The reality proved much more complex. The radically different experiences of the two parts of the continent of Europe amassed over half a century could not easily be set aside. The East's socioeconomic and political malaise did not foster European unity. The Iron Curtain turned out to be replaced by a socio-economic wall.

With the fall of Communism and the retreat of the Red Army from Eastern Europe, the continent once again experienced an identity crisis. The doubt and uncertainty that had been conspicuously absent in the early stage of the European Union now gripped West Europeans. The borders of "Europe" had previously largely run parallel with the Iron Curtain. That straightforward demarcation has now disappeared.

The paper by professor Roobol (Department of European Studies, University of Amsterdam) illustrates and examines the uncertainty that has arisen. It deals with questions such as what is Europe, and where is Europe? Which parts of Eastern Europe belong to Europe? What are the factors that determine European culture? Is there such a thing as Central Europe? Professor Roobol comes to the conclusion that he has little choice but to see Europe and Central Europe as mere stereotypes, as a collection of images that have no basis in reality. This conclusion will not be welcomed by the generation of dissident Central European writers who caused such a furore in the West in the nineteen eighties. They saw Central Europe as the "true" civilized Europe that had managed to survive the barbarism from the East.

Two different perspectives have been adopted in this volume on the integration of certain parts of the former Pax Sovietica. Some authors look at Central and Eastern Europe from a mainly Western viewpoint ( W.H. Roobol, Hans van der Meulen, Eric Dirksen and Cristian Gerner); others take account of the Central and Eastern European perspective in their analyses and conclusions, and sometimes hold a brief for the countries in this region (Peter Bugge, Bert Wiskie, György Éger and László Marácz).

In his article, Hans van der Meulen (Netherland's Institute of International Relations Clingendael) looks at the lessons that have been learnt from cross-border cooperation within the European union. It is clear that eastward integration must take place in stages. Until such time asPoland, for instance, is a full member of the European Union, regions of the Polish-German border can be brought into the EU through cross-border cooperation. Van der Meulen warns against overoptimism as regards the success of Euro-regions in Central and Eastern Europe, given EU experience in this field. As yet, Central and Eastern Europe is not ready for such partnership. Cross-border cooperation in the regions is often hampered by tensions between national states, nationalities and minorities, which have deep cultural historic roots. In his paper György Éger (Central European Institute, Budapest) lists three-border regions in Central Europe. His study can help to determine which border regions are least troubled by ethnic conflict and polarization and would, therefore, the most suitable places in which set up "Euregions".

According to Eric Dirksen (Institute for East European Studies and faculty of Economics and Econometrics, University of Amsterdam) macro-economic indicators and the present rate of privatization will rule out countries such as the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia joining the European Union before 2004-2005. This raises the question as to whether it is politically opportune to wait so long.

In his essay Christian Gerner (Department of East-European Studies, Uppsala University) explores models of eastward expansion in the mythologization of Europe. He compares the myths of European integration under Charlemagne with those of aggressive expansionism under King Arthur. Ultimately he concludes that a synthesis of the two approaches offers the best scope for eastward expansion of the European Union.

Bert Wiskie (East-West Institute, New York-Amsterdam) argues that Poland should be admitted to the European Union. It is evident, however, that the Central European collaboration initiated by this country, Hungary and the Czech Republic in 1990 in the shape of Visegrád cooperation has not been a success. The thinking behind Visegrád was that small-scale integration could pave the way for large-scale integration. However, instead these countries have opted for nationalist, sometimes even sectionalist approach. Their progress towards integration is one of Einzelgänger. The grounds on which these three countries should be individually admitted are based, inter alia, on a historic affinity with Western Europe, their possible role as an infrastructure and financial regional center and their geopolitical vulnerability.

The apperceived historic affinity between the Czechs and Europe forms the subject of Peter Bugge's article. Bugge ( Institute of Slavic Studies, University of Aarhus) argues that today's adherents of a "return to Europe" regard the inter-war Czechoslovak "First Republic" as the time and place where the Czechs were at once most themselves and most European. Thus the myth of the First Republic is testimony to the strength of the pro-Western orientation today, when all ideas of Western or Slav alternatives seem totally discredited and whe, in the frequent cliché of the Václav Klaus government, there is "no alternative" to ECU membership.

László Marácz (Department of Russian and East European Studies, University of Amsterdam) points in his paper to the role that language plays in Central and Eastern Europe in safeguarding national and cultural identity. Unlike Western Europe, the nations of Central and Eastern Europe live in their language. Brussels may consider itself warned. The new Central and Eastern European members will not accept their languages being given marginal status within the EU.

1998 YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN STUDIES
Amsterdam

Exciting news was coming out of Hungary during the summer of 1956. Parishioners and friends who visited Hungary during the summer months brought news about the complete breakdown of the Communist order. Criticism of the regime became open and loud. People sharply criticized the Communist party and government officials. Matthias Rákosi became the center of derision. Most people felt that he was disgraced by the Kremlin and therefore was thrown open to the anger of the people. These events deeply disturbed us here in Canada and the USA for we saw no sign that Moscow would be willing to loosen its ties to the satellite countries.

In September of 1956, at the Ligonier Conference of the Hungarian-American Clergy the representatives of the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe appeared to talk about their activities. They gave a glowing report about the effectiveness and great impact of their broadcasting. We were told that among all the countries behind the Iron Curtain, Hungary was the most receptive to their presentations. While we cautioned them about their enthusiasm, they would not want to hear of our warnings, and stated very clearly that their efforts to impress the Hungarian population would continue. They were supported and encouraged by their masters in the State Department where the policy oh John Foster Dulles about "rolling back the Iron Curtain" was still dominant.

This encounter with the representatives of the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe filled us with deep concern. I personally tried to distance myself as clearly as possible from their position, knowing that the policy of "rolling back the Iron Curtain" was not supported neither by the military forces, nor by the political realities.

President Eisenhower was engaged in electioneering to secure for himself another presidential term in November. His slogan was "Peace and Prosperity". He wanted to assure the public that during his reign there will be no more military adventurism like the war in Korea. The general public was tired of wars and merely wanted to amass wealth and security after the lean years of depression and war. The status quo of dividing Europe among the winners of the Second World War, the division of Germany and the pacification of Central Europe were quite acceptable for the general public. Yes, there were tears about some of the constructed trials of statesmen and bishops and cardinals, but there was no desire whatsoever to take up arms or to engage in any form of diplomatic or military effort to free the other oppressed half of Europe. Besides, "were they not our enemies during the war" was the accepted excuse.

The last thing that President Eisenhower wanted was to rock the boat tight before the election and appear belligerent. Such activity would have contradicted his "Peace and Prosperity" program.

We left Ligonier with grave foreboding, fearing the completely out-of-step activities of our radios and of the State department.

What we dreaded became a reality on the night of October 23. We were attending a pastor's meeting with my Roman Catholic and Byzantine colleagues when someone came into the room and reported about shootings at the radio station in Budapest. Since there was no radio in the conference room, we rushed to our cars and turning on the radio were indeed witnesses to the happenings in Budapest. Our fears were substantiated.

The revolution in Hungary against the Soviet Empire electrified the country and the entire world. The heroism of the people in Budapest, the bravery of the children, the early successes filled the hearts with hope and the eyes with tears. Suddenly everyone was hoping in miracles that the Soviet could be defeated.

Immediately committees were formed to collect blood and money for the freedom-fighters. Within a few days thousands of dollars were collected and enough blood to support an army. It was heartwarming to see that Hungarian-Americans who never participated in community affairs, suddenly came forward and offered their services. There was hope against hope that the entire world come for the defense of the Hungarian cause.

President Eisenhower remained cautious. He would not commit himself nor the diplomatic apparatus of the state department to interfere on behalf of the revolution. His main concern was still the election and the proper non-belligerent relationship with the Kremlin. Added to this, Anthony Eden, the prime minister of Great Britain used the cover of the Hungarian Revolution to attack, with Israel, President Nasser's Egypt. Eisenhower was so disturbed by this stealthy action, that he lost every interest in the Hungarian happenings and turned all his anger against Eden. Since the United States would not give even diplomatic support to the brave freedom-fighters in Hungary, Russia felt free to squash the Uprising on November 4th. Even though we had anticipated this outcome, most of our fellow Hungarians did not. It took great effort to calm down our communities, wipe away the tears of frustration and anger, and to prepare for the reception of the refugees.

And the refugees did arrive by the thousands.The first plane load consisted of entirely Jewish-Hungarians, which caused quite a consternation even at the New York Times.

But then came the actual fighters and the victims of this great Uprising that shook the Soviet Empire. Luckily for

them, the economy was prospering. Jobs were plentiful and most of the newcomers were able to find employment and settle down in our established Hungarian-American communities. Our churches truly distinguished themselves by receiving, counseling and settling down our newly arri brothers and sisters.

One of the shabbiest episodes of this refugee flood was the appearance of Vice President Nixon at the Andau bridge between Austria and Hungary. The representative of the government which would not give the most minimal diplomatic support, was extending his hand to the refugees in front of the television cameras. We felt this to be the apex of hypocrisy.

It must be said that the arrivals of the 1956 Hungarian revolution turned out to be a very successful and very solid segment of our society. Hungary's loss was definitely America's gain.

Carpathian Observer
Milford, CT – USA, Vol. 18, Fall of 1998

Texas A&M University (Eastern European Studies, No. 7). Sept. 1998. 164p., permanent paper. illus. bibliog. index. L.C. 94-4667.

ISBN 0-89096-823-3. $27.95. Avail. at Internet bookstores.

In person, Csaba Téglás is a soft-spoken gentleman with a bit of a Hungarian accent. On the page, his written voice is similar. You can't hear the accent, of course, but you know it's there. A resident of White Plains for the last thirty years, Téglás has worked here as a city planner and is known locally as a champion tennis player. In person, he laughs easily. And in print his touch is light, too, although his story is often anything but.

He has written "Budapest Exit: A memoir of Fascism, Communism, and Freedom" that has been published late 1998 by Texas A&M University Press as part of its Eastern European Studies series. It's a slim volume that recounts Téglás' early years growing up in Hungary during the Nazi occupation, followed by the Stalinist takeover and on through the 1956 revolution.

Téglás' prose is spare, he tells us enough so that we understand the hardships he, his family and friends endured, but not so much that we feel overwhelmed by them. He offers the stories of ordinary people caught in awful circumstances, many of whom performed quiet acts of heroism as a matter of course.

Téglás tells his story as a series of answers to his sons' questions about his life. He'll tell them again about the time he played chess with the Russian officer in the Apartment house's basement shelter, where all the building's residents lived while the furious battle raged between the Germans and the Russians for the possession of the Hungarian capital. Yes, this Russian was the one who used to drunkenly wave his loaded gun at them, and the young Téglás had to decide whether to play for real and risk the consequences of beating the Russian or throw the game. Yes, he escaped through the Iron Curtain and persuaded a fellow refugee to throw his gun away before they fled across the border into Austria. Oh, and about those black market businesses he started at the age of 15 – well, someone had to keep food on the table after his father was taken prisoner by the Russians. Téglás may be telling his sons the same stories he's told fifty times before, but for those of us who have always had the privilege of living in a country where is our vote that decides who leads us, not the power of armies led by madmen, it is an important reminder of our precious way of life.

Téglás pride in the Hungarian people is evident throughout the book, a basic civility and decency pervades the actions of many Hungarians in the face of extreme hardship. Téglás stresses that during World War II. Hungary protected its Jews from the Nazis to a far greater degree and for longer than most other countries in Europe. His depiction of brave friends and family members is balanced by his pride in their ability to laugh and joke about their hardships and their knack for storytelling. Many times throughout the book Téglás makes us laugh, too.

Téglás wrote the book, he says, to preserve his story for his family. An avid reader of memoirs, Téglás loves to learn about different people and cultures this way, but is adamant that they portray history accurately. He wrote the book too, because he is "very upset and disappointed" after witnessing the recent "ethnic cleansing" in Europe, having lived through it himself under fascist and communist dictatorships. His epilogue reveals his passionate view that there will be no real peace in the world until minority rights are satisfied.

From the 1998 October issue of SMITHSONIAN:

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR;

THE LOVELIEST PIECE OF CURRENCY

I have ever come across was Hungary's 1,000-forint note. On it, a mother breast-feeding her baby is depicted. What a statement about what their cultural values.

Congratulations, Hungary! [Thank you, Éva!]