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June 15, 2009.
| | The Current Political Landscape in Romania in Light of the 2009 Elections | | An insider’s view by László Tőkés, Member of the European Parliament | | | | | The domestic politics of Romania have been fully subordinated to the upcoming 2009 fall presidential elections. The present head of state, Traian Băsescu, seeks reelection; his „personally directed” party, the Democratic-Liberal Party (Partidul Democrat-Liberal, PD-L), acquiesces to his political demands.
The 2008 national parliamentary election showed that the two post-communist parties are the strongest. As a result, the Social Democratic Party (Partidul Social Democrat, PSD) and the PD-L created a monster coalition, with a two-thirds majority. Theoretically, this coalition can pass any law „democratically” while totally circumventing the opposition parties of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (Romániai Magyar Demokrata Szövetség, RMDSZ) and the National Liberal Party (Partidul Naţional Liberal, PNL).
As a case in point, the governing coalition decreed on June 9, 2009 that any law adopted by Parliament can be unilaterally amended by the government before it is officially published. In fact, according to this decree (Emergency Government Regulation No 61, which amends Law No. 24/2000), the government can simply abolish the law at will, without explanation. Given that governing parties have a 73 percent majority, there is no chance that Parliament will or can enact laws that the government does not like.
European Parliamentary Elections
The governing coalition is still unstable, however. Each of the two large parties used the 2009 European Parliament elections both to test their level of support and to „overwhelm” the other. In addition, the introduction of Traian Băsescu’s daughter Elena Băsescu into the race as an independent candidate served to strengthen the „Băsescu brand”.
Ultimately, the PSD won 31.07 percent (11 mandates) and PD-L 29.71 percent (10 mandates) of the vote. To the latter’s total we can add votes for Elena Băsescu who won as an independent and managed to get 4.22 percent (1 mandate) by manipulating votes. As far as the two parliamentary opposition parties are concerned, the PNL received 14.52 percent (5 mandates), and the RMDSZ — together with the Hungarian National Council of Transylvania (Erdélyi Magyar Nemzeti Tanács, EMNT) led by László Tőkés — got 8.92 percent (3 mandates). It is alarming that the ultranationalist Greater Romania Party (Partidul România Mare, PRM) has now sent three representatives to the European Parliament. PRM, which did not manage to secure enough votes for the national parliament in 2008, garnered a whopping 8.65 percent of the vote in 2009. Among these representatives are Corneliu-Vadim Tudor, Ceauşescu’s infamous court poet, and Gigi Becali who was once a shepherd and is now a billionaire „politician”.
Hungarian Alliance
The 2009 European Parliamentary elections proved to be a turning point for the Hungarians of Transylvania. It was the first time since losing its position as member of the governing coalition that RMDSZ—which defines itself as the sole organization representing Hungarian interests—joined in coalition with a separate political entity. The Hungarian Alliance succeeded beyond expectations. Surpassing the indifference which characterized the European Parliament elections throughout Europe, the Hungarian Alliance won 9 percent of the vote. A low overall voter turnout resulted in a higher percentage of Hungarian votes being counted than the general population’s Hungarian percentage (which constitutes 6 percent).
The startling election results demonstrate two important factors in Romania’s current political scene. First, the Hungarian Alliance, with a 9 percent mandate, must flex its political muscle. Secondly, this political activism is absolutely necessary in the face of overt discrimination in current government policies. In order to satisfy its clientele, the monster coalition has already begun a cleansing campaign to dismiss civil servants on political grounds. In parts of Transylvania inhabited primarily by Hungarians, this policy is tantamount to bloodless ethnic cleansing. Two counties with an 80 percent Hungarian population are now governed by Romanian officials (Prefects) who do not know the language and the culture of the local community. Their professional expertise is justified mainly by the color of their political party membership card.
Economic Crisis
Meanwhile, the government has been trying to cover up the effects of the economic crisis through ad-hoc provisions. A recent example of this is the inconsistent discussion of the IMF loan. Initially deemed unnecessary, the loan was embraced just two weeks later, on March 25, 2009. Romania’s economy has entered a downward spiral, and there is no clear government policy to deal with the situation.
Foreign Policy Blow
In the confusion following national elections in the neighboring Republic of Moldova, Romania again gave ground to revisionist voices. Certain Romanian politicians urged the union of the Republic of Moldova and Romania. Meanwhile, on April 15, 2009, the Romanian state issued a Government Emergency Ordinance (36/2009), which modifies the Law on Citizenship (21/1991). This new ordinance streamlines the citizenship application procedure for thousands of Moldovan citizens. Moldovans who claim Romanian heritage (even three generations back) can apply for—and be granted—Romanian citizenship in as little as five months. Thus, an EU-member state charged with defending the eastern border of the European Union provides dual citizenship and voting rights to millions of non-EU citizens based solely on ethnicity.
Democracy Deficiencies
Major deficiencies persist in delivering on the promise of democratic reforms. As one of many examples, the process of returning church properties illegally confiscated under communism has stalled. Meanwhile, the Romanian Orthodox Church, which is de facto the state religion, can use billions in tax revenues to build its cathedrals and maintain its flourishing businesses. Legislation, and especially public administration, is marred by partisan politics. Brussels has postponed its country report on Romania until the fall, a move which led to speculation of partisanship. Minorities are still discriminated against; as is common across Europe, there is no Roma integration policy. In terms of education policy, total chaos masquerades as reform. The highest rate of regulatory change affects national education, as each new minister introduces fundamentally different education policies.
The Situation of Hungarians in Transylvania
With respect to the Hungarian community in Transylvania, it has repeatedly been shown that economic benefits secured through government intervention are not sufficient in and of themselves. Such measures of sporadic financial assistance, infrastructure repairs, and the creation of schools by government decree, moreover, can be terminated quickly and easily. This applies generally to the Central European countries inhabited by large Hungarian minority communities.
Autonomy
The advocates of autonomous arrangements have been clearly justified: the rights of any indigenous community can be secured only through institutional legal guarantees. In other words, the creation of a legal framework comprised of various forms of community-specific autonomy holds the only hope of a lasting solution to the question of national minorities. Here it is worth noting that efforts aimed at resolving the South Slavic crisis such as the Carrington Plan, the Rambouillet Negotiations, the Dayton Accords, the Ohrid Convention, and the Ahtisaari Plan, were all based upon providing various degrees of autonomy. Thus, on a more general scale, the question of autonomy is also a security policy matter. In our country, legislative efforts are either rejected or delayed repeatedly by the Romanian majority in the Romanian Parliament. The expressed will of the people is disregarded. This was the case in a referendum to grant the Székely Region in Transylvania a special legal status since the area is inhabited by a Hungarian majority of 80 percent. Despite clear voter support, 220,000 votes were rejected.
Language Rights
There are no means to enforce the law that provides language rights in Romania. Although the law makes bilingualism or multilingualism compulsory for public institutions in communities inhabited by more than 20 percent of a national minority, non-compliance with the law carries no sanction. The law allows minority citizens to defend their rights with the assistance of an interpreter at court, yet in most cases no resources are available to fund an interpreter. There have even been court trials where a Hungarian lawyer representing a Hungarian plaintiff had to communicate with the Hungarian judge in the Romanian language. An even more severe problem is in health care: the implementation of language rights for nationally-recognized minorities is not compulsory in hospitals and clinics. Instead, it is left up to the discretion of doctors and nurses whether or not to speak to a minority patient in his or her native language.
Hungarian-Language Higher Education in Transylvania
The Babeş-Bolyai University in Kolozsvár (Cluj) was forced to merge with its Romanian counterpart exactly 50 years ago, and the combined institution is frequently cited as an example of multiculturalism. Yet there are still no independently functioning Hungarian and German faculties today. The autonomy of departments to teach in other languages at the University is merely symbolic (not to mention the issue of financial independence), and the university administration even prohibits the placement of Hungarian- and German-language signs. Meanwhile, the number of Hungarian students in higher education studying in their native language is significantly lower than their proportion of the population would warrant.
In an attempt to remedy the situation, Hungarians in Romania established a private university network with the help of the government of the Republic of Hungary. This network consists of the Partium Christian University (Partiumi Keresztény Egyetem, PKE) and Sapientia–Hungarian University of Transylvania (Sapientia-Erdélyi Magyar Tudományegyetem, Sapientia-EMTE). The Romanian state accredited PKE after four years of legal wrangling. But it has yet to contribute a single dime to its upkeep, while in the meantime it collects large sums in taxes from the wages of the university staff.
Conclusion
Twenty years after the Revolution in Temesvár (Timisoara) it can be concluded that post communists in Romania retain a tight grip on power. The process of democratic reform has stalled, and nationalist-communist reflexes are alive again. National minorities, a significant part of the population, still face discrimination. As far as the individual is concerned, the human dignity of European citizens is ignored by government decisions that cannot be influenced by neither opposition politicians, nor its citizens. |
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