AUTONOMY: THE SPIRIT OF THE AGE

by Miklos Duray

The concept of autonomy has its supporters and detractors. I am one of its supporters, and it should come as no surprise that I contend the following: support for autonomy amounts to the embrace of democracy, while rejection of autonomy is tantamount to rejecting democracy. In my opinion the distinction is that simple — though, clearly, each point of view can be expressed and explained in varying forms.

What, then, is the essence of autonomy? For the ever-dwindling ranks of those who have received a classical education, the meaning of autonomy could not be clearer: it simply means self-government. Autonomy as self-government can also be recognised as nothing other than the evolution and logical realisation of the society's development over time.

Autonomy, in this sense, has emerged in two versions: the self: proclaimed version (for example, the oligarchy of the Middle Ages) and the constitutional one (for example, the free cities and the Transylvanian Saxons), together with their privileges. Those privileges, in today's terms, were akin to a special status — a concept that in our days, has been increasingly mentioned in international documents since 1992.

To reiterate, then: the essence of autonomy is self-government. At present, the Hungarian-inhabited regions of East Central Europe know two functioning versions of self-government: local government institutions (throughout the region) and minority self-government (in Hungary).

Local regional self-government, if evenly extended to the whole of a country, can be called a symmetric system of self-government, that is, one without privileges. The viability of this system depends on whether local self-government is based on the principle of "subsidiarity" (i.e., built from the ground up), or, alternatively, local government powers are granted by the grace of the central government.

Clearly, I am in favor of the former: self-government based on "subsidiarity", that is, deriving its powers from below. This further implies that only those functions which can not be exercised at the local and regional level should be delegated to the central government (i.e., the executive, the parliament and other state agencies) — and these functions are relatively few (among them are military affairs, foreign affairs, finance, state security, co-ordination of economic and energy policy, environmental protection, strategic planning, and central legislation).

Self-government of this kind, built from below, can generally be achieved only if the State has the sense that it is a strong and stable one, one that is legitimate in every aspect. In contrast, the less legitimate and the less democratic the country is, the narrower the field becomes for (local) self-government to exercise jurisdiction. Restrictions on self-government, in turn, may lead to local tensions, for without adequate self-government, it becomes impossible to manage the historical or ethnic variety which may exist in the country. In countries such as these, the symmetric type of self-government becomes unworkable, and the alternative solution ins the asymmetric type.

Asymmetric self-government — a system which does not extend to every part of the country — be realised in two ways. One is the establishment of local or regional bodies which act as adjuncts to regionally elected self-government institutions; these bodies have the same legitimacy as the self-government institutions, but exercise special jurisdiction (i.e., on certain issues). This is what is autonomy, for it was originally created for the lawful management of the affairs of communities which constitute a minority.

The other form of asymmetric self-government is that of regional autonomy. This is the classic type of asymmetric self-government, in which one or more regions of a country, defined according to a historical or ethnic principle, are granted a special status, and in which a particular legal system comes in to effects — a system which differs from that in other parts of the country, but which is determined constitutionally or by agreement.

Personal autonomy can be realised in both the symmetric and the asymmetric systems. But while the symmetric system (the Swiss model) can lead to a confederate system, by dividing the country into cantons based on historical and ethnic principles, the asymmetric system (the South Tyrolean model) is suitable for the establishment of a special status.

It should be pointed out, however, that neither of the solutions is contrary to the principles of civil society, since both are based upon self-government. But while in the symmetric system the principle of self-government — this fundamental of civil society — is manifested equally in every region, in an asymmetric system, self-government is manifested in varying forms.

Another issue of importance is that of individual and collective rights: autonomy is often identified with collective rights, as opposed to individual rights. But this perception (of autonomy in opposition to individual rights) is erroneous. Collective rights refer mainly to social privileges (for example, the privileges of the nobility before the emergence of the liberal constitutional state, or self-government achieved without a referendum). In contrast, autonomy is based on the individual's exercise of his or her (individual) rights.

However, we must distinguish between two types of individual rights. On type includes those rights that the individual can exercise independently (e.g. equal representation in court, civil liberties, and most of the other basic human rights). The other type consists of rights that have meaning only if exercised in community with others: for example, the right to use the native language, to receive education in the native language, to promote the community's cultural values, to retain the ethnic composition of a particular region, to fight discrimination against the community, to make effective decisions on matters pertaining to the community (i.e., effective representation).

At the dawn of the 21st century, in a Europe which is poised for integration on a continental scale, these issues of autonomy and self-government are unmistakably bound up with the exercise of democratic principles. One might say that today, those forces which are rejecting autonomy and self-government are also impeding the progress of Europe, these forces advocate society's backsliding to a more primitive state. In contrast, those who support autonomy also promote the progress of Europe. It is unfortunate that the rift between these two visions is amounting to a new division within Europe. Clearly, those who accept the principle of autonomy will find it easier to integrate with the community of European states, while those who reject it will probably land on the waiting list. It should be noted, finally, that this division reflects not any insidious, greater political scheme, but rather the acceptance or rejection, respectively, of the prevailing spirit of our age.

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